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Abstract—We consider a multihypothesis social learning prob-
lem in which an agent has access to a set of private observations
and chooses an opinion from a set of experts to incorporate into
its final decision. To model individual biases, we allow the agent
and experts to have general loss functions and possibly different
decision spaces. We characterize the loss exponents of both the
agent and experts, and provide an asymptotically optimal method
for the agent to choose the best expert to follow. We show that up
to asymptotic equivalence, the worst loss exponent for the agent is
achieved when it adopts the 0-1 loss function, which assigns a loss
of 0 if the true hypothesis is declared and a loss of 1 otherwise.
We introduce the concept of hypothesis-loss neutrality, and show
that if the agent adopts a particular policy that is hypothesis-
loss neutral, then it ignores all experts whose decision spaces
are smaller than its own. On the other hand, if experts have
the same decision space as the agent, then choosing an expert
with the same loss function as itself is not necessarily optimal
for the agent, which is somewhat counter-intuitive. We derive
sufficient conditions for when it is optimal for the agent with 0-1
loss function to choose an expert with the same loss function.
Index Terms—Social learning, decentralized detection, error
exponent, social network, Internet of Things.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly connected world, our opinions on a phe-
nomenon of interest or event are often not only influenced by
our direct independent observations, but also by other people’s
public opinions on related events. In an online social network
like Twitter or Facebook, users’ opinions and postings are
often influenced by the opinions of those they are connected to
or are “following” in the social network [1]–[4]. For example,
in viral marketing using social networks, marketing companies
often target a few influential nodes in the network to help them
push a product [5], [6]. Similarly, widespread online access
has made it easier for us to follow the opinions of experts
like celebrities and industry insiders, who may have access
to private information that we are unaware of. For example,
we may be interested to determine the financial health of a
publicly listed company. In addition to our own observations
about the company through its annual financial reports and
stock prices, we may also choose to incorporate the “expert”
opinion provided by financial blogs like [7] and [8]. In all
these examples, inference about a phenomenon of interest is
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not only based on direct observations but also the opinions of
other entities. This is known as social learning [9], [10].
A further example is the Internet of Things (IoT) framework
[11], [12]. Sensors each make their own private observations
but collaborate by exchanging public information. This can be
viewed as a “physical social network” of devices, cooperating
to improve their situational awareness. Sensors originally
designed for a specific purpose may collaborate with other
sensors to perform inference on a phenomenon they were not
specifically designed for. However, in order to ensure energy
efficiency, each sensor needs to intelligently choose which
other sensors to collaborate with since not all sensors may
provide information relevant to it. For example, a sensor trying
to estimate the temperature in a particular room of a building
may choose to incorporate information from other temperature
sensors or sensors tracking the number of occupants in the
building, instead of information from a vibration monitoring
sensor.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of multihypothesis
social learning in which an agent can select an expert opinion
from a group of experts, to incorporate into its final decision in
order to minimize its expected loss. Specifically, we consider
an agent 0 who wishes to choose from a set of M hypotheses
based on its own observations as well as the opinion of an
expert chosen from a set of K possible experts. Each expert
has access to a set of private observations, which they use to
form their own opinions about the true hypothesis, subject to
their own local loss functions or biases, which may differ from
that of agent 0. By taking into account the experts’ individual
biases, our goal is to find an asymptotically optimal expert
choice in order to minimize agent 0’s expected loss.
A. Related Work
The problem of selecting the best expert opinion to follow is
related to the problem of decentralized detection or decentral-
ized hypothesis testing, which has been extensively studied
in [13]–[23] and the references therein. In the decentralized
detection problem, each agent has its own private observations,
but cooperate with each other so that the whole network of
agents reaches a decision regarding a common underlying phe-
nomenon of interest. Here, which agent passes information to
which other agent is determined by a known network topology
like the parallel configuration [24], tandem network [25]–[27],
and tree architectures [19]–[22]. Therefore, all these works
do not consider the problem of selecting which other agent’s
opinion to follow. Furthermore, in a decentralized detection
problem, all agents are assumed to have the same hypotheses
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2and loss functions for declaring the wrong hypothesis, or have
the common goal of minimizing the loss at a last agent known
as the fusion center.
We study a related but somewhat different problem from
the decentralized detection problem. We consider the sce-
nario where experts may make decisions according to their
own biases, instead of minimizing the loss of a particular
agent or fusion center. In [9], the authors consider binary
hypothesis testing in a social network, in which agents se-
quentially observe the opinions of a stochastically generated
neighborhood of agents in the network. Each agent has the
same 0-1 loss function,1 and conditions are derived for the
Bayesian error probability of the nth agent to approach to
zero as n becomes large. The network model we consider
in this paper is equivalent to a two-layer hierarchical tree
network, which is much simpler compared to that studied in
[9]. This is because our goal is to analyze how an expert’s
opinion impacts that of a particular agent. In addition, we
consider a multihypothesis testing problem in which each
agent has different loss functions or even different number
of hypotheses.
Since finding optimal decision rules for general decentral-
ized hypothesis testing problems is NP-complete [28], it is
difficult to find analytical characterizations for the best expert
choice in networks of moderate size, and where agents have
private observations that are not conditionally independent
given the underlying hypothesis. Therefore, most of the lit-
erature in decentralized detection has focused on the case
where observations are conditionally independent [13]–[22].
The same challenge applies to the social learning problem
in this paper, and we therefore consider only the case where
agents’ private observations are conditionally independent.
Although the problem becomes numerically tractable under
this assumption, it remains hard to characterize the agents’
optimal policies and decision rules analytically (see [21] for
a discussion). To overcome this difficulty, we consider the
regime where each agent has access to an asymptotically large
number of private observations (e.g., over a sufficiently long
period of time) but each agent’s observation sources and loss
functions may differ. This allows us to adopt a large deviations
perspective to the expert choice problem, and derive analytical
characterizations of the optimal choice and agent strategies.
The reference [29] considers a multihypothesis testing prob-
lem in a parallel configuration with a single agent, which is
allowed to take actions that affect the observations it makes.
The distribution of the observation at each time step depends
on the action of the agent in the previous time step, and
has bounded Kullback-Liebler divergences under any pair of
hypotheses. The agent’s aim is to minimize the error exponent
corresponding to the 0-1 loss function. Our work can be
viewed as a generalization of a result in [29] (which also
considers the sequential detection problem that we do not
study here) to the case where one of the agent observations
is the opinion of an expert, which itself has asymptotically
many private observations leading to unbounded Kullback-
1The 0-1 loss function assigns a loss of 0 if the agent declares the same
hypothesis as the true underlying hypothesis, and a loss of 1 otherwise.
Liebler divergences for its opinion. Furthermore, we consider
general loss functions and the corresponding loss exponent,
which is a generalization of the error exponent in [29]. The
characterization of the error exponents corresponding to 0-1
loss functions in multihypothesis testing has also been studied
in [30], [31], which derive the achievable error exponents
region.
B. Our Contributions
Our goal is to optimize the loss exponent of agent 0, the
absolute value of which is the rate of decay of the expected
loss incurred by agent 0 as the number of private observations
grows large. We suppose that agent 0 has a decision space
consisting of M hypotheses, and has a choice of K expert
opinions to follow.
(i) We consider a general M -ary multihypothesis social
learning framework in which an agent 0 and every expert
have loss functions that depend on the number of private
observations the agent or expert has access to. Each
expert makes a decision that takes values from a decision
space, the size of which may not be the same as M .
We characterize the loss exponent of each expert, and
provide an asymptotically optimal policy for an expert
to achieve its optimal loss exponent (Theorem 2).
(ii) We derive the optimal loss exponent for agent 0 after
it has incorporated the opinion of a particular expert,
and provide an asymptotically optimal method for agent
0 to choose the best expert to follow (Theorem 5). We
also show that the worst loss exponent, up to asymptotic
equivalence,2 for agent 0 is achieved when agent 0 adopts
the 0-1 loss function (cf. Remark 3 of Section IV-A).
(iii) We introduce the concept of hypothesis-loss neutrality
in Section IV-B, and show that if agent 0 adopts a
hypothesis-loss neutral policy, then the opinion of any
expert who has a decision space with number of states
strictly less than M , is ignored by agent 0 (Proposition
6). In this case, additional information is useless, which
is somewhat unexpected.
(iv) We show that if all experts have the same decision space
as agent 0, then it is not necessarily optimal for agent
0 to choose the expert with the same loss function as
itself. This is surprising as conventional wisdom seems to
suggest otherwise. If agent 0 adopts the 0-1 loss function,
we derive sufficient conditions for when it is optimal to
choose an expert who also utilizes the 0-1 loss function
(Proposition 7).
In this work, we do not address the case where agent 0’s
opinion may be utilized by one of the experts, which result in
much more complex opinion dynamics than that considered
in this paper. This leads to the interesting question of whether
there exists an equilibrium in the choice of loss functions in
a network of agents who can incorporate opinions from each
other. This is however out of the scope of the current work,
and will be addressed in our future research.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we describe our system model, problem formulation and
2See Section II-C for the definition of asymptotic equivalence.
3assumptions. We characterize the agents’ loss exponents in
Section III, and provide asymptotically optimal policies to
achieve the optimal loss exponents. In Section IV, we discuss
the optimal expert choice for agent 0, and derive insights into
this choice by making simplifying assumptions. We conclude
in Section V. Appendix A contains a brief review of some
basic definitions of large deviations theory, and we defer all
proofs to Appendix B. Appendix C contains a characterization
of the asymptotic decision regions, which are introduced in
Section III-A.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we define our system model, assumptions
and some notations. We consider an underlying measurable
space (Ω,F) on which all random variables in this paper
are defined. We adopt the following notations throughout this
paper. Let R be the space of real numbers, and let 〈t, z〉 be the
inner product of the vectors t and z in RM−1. For z ∈ RM−1,
let z0 = (0, z) ∈ RM be the vector augmented with a zero
as the first element. The range of integers a, a + 1, . . . , b
is denoted as [a, b]. The notations x[1 : n] and (xi)ni=1 are
used to represent the sequences x = (x[1], x[2], . . . , x[n]) and
(x1, x2, . . . , xn), respectively. We also make use of x[i] to
denote the ith element in the vector or sequence x.
A. Learning From an Expert
Suppose that an agent 0 wishes to determine the underlying
hypothesis H associated with a phenomenon of interest, which
from agent 0’s frame of reference can be modeled by a set of
probability measures {Pm : m = 0, 1, . . . ,M−1} on the space
(Ω,F). Let Em be the mathematical expectation under Pm,
and let H = m ∈ [0,M−1] if all agents’ private observations
have distributions derived from the probability measure Pm.
We suppose that H = m has prior probability pim ∈ (0, 1).
The agent 0 can choose to incorporate the opinion of an expert,
chosen from a set of expert agents {1, 2, . . . ,K} (see Figure
1). If there is no need to distinguish between agent 0 and the
experts, we use the generic term “agent” to refer to either of
them.
Each agent k ∈ {0, . . . ,K} has access to a set of private
observations Yk[1 : nk] = (Yk[1], . . . , Yk[nk]). Conditioned on
H = m, we assume that each Yk[l], for l = 1, . . . , nk, is drawn
independently from a conditional distribution belonging to the
set {Pγm : γ ∈ Γk}, where Γk is a finite index set representing
the information sources of agent k. The distribution set {Pγm :
γ ∈ Γk} varies from agent to agent, and models the differences
in quality of information that each agent may have access to.
We assume that for each γ ∈ Γk, the probability measures Pγm
for m = 0, . . . ,M −1, are absolutely continuous with respect
to (w.r.t.) each other, and are known to all the agents. We
further assume that conditioned on H , all the random variables
(Yk[1 : nk])
K
k=0 are independent.
3
To motivate our setup, consider the example alluded to in
Section I, where an agent 0 is interested to determine the
3Although two experts may have the same information source, we assume
their private observations from this source are independent due to their own
noisy interpretations of the same piece of information.
Dk D0
Yk[1] Yk[nk] Y0[1] Y0[n0]
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}
FIG. 1: Learning network in which agent 0 incorporates the decision of an
agent k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
financial health of a large publicly listed conglomerate. In
addition to its own observations Y0[1 : n0] about the company
through annual financial reports and other publicly available
indicators like stock prices, the agent 0 may also choose
to incorporate the expert opinion of an investment analyst.
Because of limited financial resources (since most analyst
reports are not free), agent 0 can only choose to subscribe
to one analyst, and has to make an optimal choice of which
analyst to use. In most of this paper, for simplicity, we restrict
ourselves to the case where the opinion of a single expert
is considered in the decision making of agent 0, and show
how to generalize our results to a finite set of experts later
in Remark 4 of Section IV. Note also that the number of
information sources for each agent is also typically finite as
in this example, which justifies our assumption that |Γk|<∞
for all k ≥ 0.
Let xk = (xk[γ])γ∈Γk be a vector of non-negative weights
summing to one, where bxk[γ]nkc is the number of private
observations of agent k that have conditional distribution
Pγm when the hypothesis H = m. We let the remaining
nk −
∑
γ∈Γk bxk[γ]nkc observations be drawn from an ar-
bitrary distribution from the set {Pγm : γ ∈ Γk}. Since we
are concerned about asymptotics in this paper, the choice of
the arbitrary distribution is immaterial to our analysis. We say
that xk is a policy for agent k. An agent chooses its policy in
order to minimize its expected loss, as described below. Let
S(Γk) be the simplex consisting of all agent policies.
Based on its observations, each expert k ≥ 1 makes a
decision Dk = γk(Yk[1 : nk]) ∈ [0, dk − 1] by minimizing
a local loss criterion. We assume that every expert k ≥ 1
chooses its policy xk and decision rule γk so that
E [Ck(H,Dk, nk)] (1)
is minimized, where Ck(m, d, nk) is a non-negative finite
loss incurred if the decision of expert k is d when the true
hypothesis is H = m. We can think of Ck(·, ·, ·) as encoding
the “bias” of expert k. We call this the loss function of expert
k, and
lim sup
nk→∞
1
nk
logE [Ck(H,Dk, nk)] (2)
the loss exponent of expert k. An example of a loss function is
the 0-1 loss function: Ck(m,m, nk) = 0, and Ck(m, d, nk) =
1 for all nk ≥ 1 if d 6= m, which results in (1) being the
error probability considered in [32]. In this paper, we consider
4the regime where experts have asymptotically large number
nk of private observations, which corresponds to the case
where experts are very experienced in their respective fields
(as determined by Γk).
By allowing the loss function to depend on the number of
private observations, we can model various practical appli-
cations. For example, the expert k may itself be part of a
decentralized detection network like a tree configuration [21],
[26], in which case its goal is to minimize the Bayesian error
probability at a fusion center. Then, its loss function decays
exponentially fast in the number of private observations nk. In
the publicly listed conglomerate example, suppose that one of
the hypotheses corresponds to the conglomerate being finan-
cially bankrupt. The loss associated with a missed detection
of this hypothesis can be modeled to be exponentially larger
than the loss associated with a missed detection of another
more benign hypothesis.
In our model, expert k’s decision space consists of dk states,
where dk may not equal to M , the number of hypotheses that
agent 0 is interested in. This allows us to model scenarios
where different agents may have different models for the
underlying state of the world. Using the conglomerate example
described above, agent 0 may be interested in the financial
health of the whole conglomerate, while a particular analyst
may only be interested in the real estate arm of the conglomer-
ate. Nevertheless, the performance of the real estate arm has a
bearing on the overall health of the conglomerate. In particular,
expert k may not distinguish between two hypotheses, say
H = M−2 and H = M−1. This can be modeled by assuming
that the expert declares the decision d = m when H = m <
M−2 and d = M−2 if H = M−2 or M−1. In this case, we
let Ck(M−2, d, nk) = Ck(M−1, d, nk) = 1 for all d < M−2
and Ck(M − 2,M − 2, nk) = Ck(M − 1,M − 2, nk) = 0.
This model is also general enough to model different decision
spaces that may not map directly to any of the hypotheses of
agent 0.
On the other hand, we note that without loss of generality,
there is no need to consider the case where an expert uses
a model in which there are more than M hypotheses, since
agent 0 can always choose a M that is sufficiently large in
its model. In addition, since our analysis is based on the
frame of reference of agent 0, it has no knowledge of any
additional hypotheses, and in practical applications, it simply
assumes that expert k minimizes the expected loss given in
(1). We assume that based on the publicized expertise of each
expert, agent 0 knows its loss function decay rates, defined in
Assumption 1 below.
B. Loss of Agent 0
Let D0(k) = γ0(Y0[1 : n0], Dk) ∈ [0,M − 1] be the
decision made by agent 0 after incorporating the opinion Dk
of agent k. The expected loss of agent 0 is
E [C0(H,D0(k), n0)],
where C0(m, d, n0) is the non-negative loss incurred by agent
0 if it decides in favor of hypothesis d when the true hypothesis
is H = m, and the number of private observations is n0. We
make the following assumptions regarding the loss function of
each agent.
Assumption 1.
(i) For all n0 ≥ 1 and m ∈ [0,M − 1], we have
C0(m,m, n0) = 0, and for every d ∈ [0,M − 1] such
that d 6= m, we have 0 < C0(m, d, n0) ≤ 1 with
− lim
n0→∞
1
n0
logC0(m, d, n0) = c0(m, d) ≡ c0(m) ∈ [0,∞).
(ii) For each agent k ≥ 1, we have for every m ∈ [0,M −1]
and d ∈ [0, dk − 1],
− lim
nk→∞
1
nk
logCk(m, d, nk) = ck(m, d) ≥ 0.
We assume that agent 0 knows the loss function decay
rates ck(·, ·), for all k = 1, . . . ,K, based on the
publicized expertise of each expert.
Since the number of agents and decision states are finite,
we can normalize Ck(m, d, nk) by max
m,d,k
Ck(m, d, nk) or∑
d,k
Ck(m, d, nk) so that there is no loss in generality in
assuming that Ck(m, d, nk) ≤ 1 for all m, d, and k. In
Assumption 1(i), we make the simplifying assumption that
the loss function decay rate for agent 0 w.r.t. a particular
hypothesis is the same for all wrong decisions. This is because
otherwise, easy examples can be constructed in which agent
0 declares the wrong hypothesis with high probability for
large n0. To see this, suppose that all hypotheses have the
same prior probability, H = 0 is the true hypothesis, and
agent 0’s observations are all drawn from the same conditional
distribution. The loss of agent 0 if it makes the decision d is,
with high probability, approximately proportional to∑
m 6=d
e−n0(c0(m,d)+K0m),
where K0m is the Kullback-Liebler divergence of the condi-
tional distribution under H = 0 versus that under H = m [33].
If c0(0, 1) > c0(1, 0)+K01, while c0(m, 1) > c0(m, 0) for all
m 6= 0, 1, then agent 0 decides in favor of H = 1 instead of
H = 0 when n0 is large. This is clearly an undesirable model
as c0(m, 1) > c0(m, 0) for all m 6= 0, 1 implies that the agent
imposes an exponentially smaller loss when declaring H = 1
versus H = 0. In this case, an arguably more appropriate
modeling approach is to merge the hypothesis H = 1 into
another hypothesis.
In Assumption 1(ii), we assume that agent 0 knows the loss
function decay rates of the experts. This assumption may not
hold in some practical applications, in which case we need to
impose uncertainties on agent 0’s knowledge about the experts,
similar in spirit to [34]. This unfortunately makes the problem
much more challenging, and is out of the scope of our current
work. The results in this work serve as the basic foundation
on which the more challenging problem in which agent 0 has
limited knowledge of the experts, can be addressed in future
research.
5C. Asymptotic Equivalence and Optimal Loss Exponent
Consider two loss functions with loss decay rates ck(m, d)
and c′k(m, d) respectively. If ck(m, d) and c
′
k(m, d) differ by
the same constant for all m and d, then their corresponding
loss exponents (2) are different but the optimal policies to
minimize (2) are the same. We therefore say that two loss
functions are asymptotically equivalent if their respective
loss decay rates ck(m, d) and c′k(m, d) differ by the same
constant for all m and d. It can be shown that each loss
function belongs to an equivalence class, with the equivalence
relation being asymptotic equivalence. We call a loss function
with minm,d ck(m, d) = 0 a canonical loss function of its
equivalence class. For example, the 0-1 loss function is a
canonical loss function of its equivalence class. In another
example, consider the set of all loss functions Ck(m, d, nk)
with
∑
d Ck(m, d, nk) = C for each m and nk, which imposes
a total loss of C for each hypothesis. Then, it can be shown
that each of these loss functions is a canonical loss function.
We say that two loss exponents are equivalent if they have
the same policy and their loss functions are asymptotically
equivalent. For fair comparison of loss exponents, we will
always assume canonical loss functions. We are interested to
characterize the optimal loss exponent4
min
1≤k≤K
lim sup
n0→∞
1
n0
logE [C0(H,D0(k), n0)], (3)
when the number of private observations of agent 0 becomes
large. Note that although agent 0 is allowed an asymptotically
large number of private observations, the quality of informa-
tion available to agent 0 is constrained by the set Γ0. The
experts’ information sources {Γk : k = 1, . . . ,K} are different
from Γ0, and may thus improve the loss exponent of agent 0.
We assume that for all experts k ≥ 1, qk = limn0→∞ nk/n0
exists as a limit. If the number nk of private observations of
expert k is such that qk = 0, agent 0 will ignore the opinion
of expert k as its opinion becomes asymptotically negligible
compared to agent 0’s private observations. Therefore, without
loss of generality, we assume that qk > 0 for all k ≥ 1.
D. Technical Definitions
In this subsection, we define notations that will be com-
monly used throughout the paper. We rely heavily on the
mechanisms of large deviations theory to characterize the
agents’ loss exponents (2) and (3). We refer the reader to
Appendix A for a brief overview of some basic concepts, and
to [35] for a detailed treatment of large deviations theory. As
the theory of large deviations in hypothesis testing problems
utilizes log moment generating functions of log likelihood
ratios, and their Fenchel-Legendre transforms in order to
characterize the loss exponents, we define these necessary
quantities in the following.
For any given random variable X with marginal distribution
PXi under hypothesis H = i, we abuse notation by letting
`ij(X) be the Radon-Nikodym derivative (or likelihood ratio)
of PXi w.r.t. PXj . Note that `ij(X) is a random variable that
4Note that because of Assumption 1, the loss exponent is negative, with a
more negative loss exponent corresponding to a faster loss decay rate.
depends on the distributions and realization of X . By conven-
tion, we let `ii(X) = 1 for all values of i and all realizations
of X . In addition, for simplicity, we let `γij = dP
γ
i /dP
γ
j
be the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Pγi w.r.t. P
γ
j , for each
γ ∈ ⋃k Γk.
Let Zγ = (log `γm0)
M−1
m=1 be a vector of log likelihood ratios,
and the log moment generating function of Zγ under H = m
be
ξm(γ, t) = logEm [exp(〈t, Zγ〉)],
for all t ∈ RM−1. For a policy x = (x[γ])γ∈Γk of an agent
k, the weighted log moment generating function is then given
by
ϕm(t, x) =
∑
γ∈Γk
x[γ]ξm(γ, t), (4)
and its Fenchel-Legendre transform [35] is
Φ∗m(z, x) = sup
t∈RM−1
{〈t, z〉 − ϕm(t, x)} , (5)
where z ∈ RM−1. The function Φ∗m(z, x) will be shown
in Theorem 2 to characterize the rates of decay of the
probabilities Pm(Dk = d), similar to the rate functions in
large deviations theory [35].
When an expert k’s decision space has size dk = M , the
rates of decay of the probabilities Pm(Dk = d) become easier
to characterize since we can now interpret a decision d of
the expert k to be in favor of hypothesis d. Then, under the
true hypothesis H = m, the log moment generating function
of interest is the one involving the likelihood ratios of the
observation distributions under hypothesis d versus hypothesis
m, given by
Λij(s, x) =
∑
γ∈Γk
x[γ] logEi
[
(`γji)
s
]
. (6)
The Fenchel-Legendre transform of Λij is then given by
Λ∗ij(z, x) = sup
s∈R
{sz − Λij(s, x)} ,
where z ∈ R.
We assume that the distributions {Pγm, γ ∈
⋃
k Γk} are well-
behaved for all m ∈ [0,M − 1] in the following assumption,
which holds for example in the case where all conditional dis-
tributions are from the exponential families. This assumption
is required in all our proofs in order to show that an agent’s
loss exponent cannot be better than a certain achievable lower
bound, which we characterize in order to derive the agent’s
optimal policy.
Assumption 2. For all m ∈ [0,M − 1] and all γ ∈ ⋃k Γk,
ξm(γ, t) <∞ for all t ∈ RM−1.
E. Results Overview
If agent 0 incorporates the opinion of expert k, we expect the
loss exponent of expert k to determine how useful its opinion
is to agent 0. Therefore, we first find the loss exponent of each
expert k in Theorem 2, which also provides an asymptotically
optimal policy for expert k. Then, we proceed to determine
the loss exponent of agent 0 if it incorporates the opinion of a
6particular expert k in Theorem 4. To find the optimal expert,
we simply optimize the loss exponent found in Theorem 4
over the whole set of experts, which is essentially the content
of Theorem 5. Based on the conclusions of Theorem 5, we
provide detailed procedures in Remark 2 of Section IV-A that
allow agent 0 to compute its asymptotically optimal expert
choice and policy. Finally, we provide insights into the optimal
expert choice under simplifying assumptions in Propositions
6 and 7.
III. OPTIMAL LOSS EXPONENTS
In this section, we first characterize the loss exponents of
the experts k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, which leads to an asymptotically
optimal policy for each expert. We then characterize the loss
exponent of agent 0, assuming that it is following the opinion
of some expert k.
A. Loss Exponents of Experts
Consider an expert k, where k = 1, . . . ,K. By conditioning
on the observations Yk[1 : nk], it can be shown (Proposition
2.3 of [24]) that the optimal decision rule for expert k is given
by
Dk = arg min
0≤d≤dk−1
M−1∑
m=0
pimCk(m, d, nk)`m0(Yk[1 : nk]),
(7)
where `m0(Yk[1 : nk]) =
∏nk
l=1 `m0(Yk[l]). In general, the
right hand side of (7) may have multiple minimizers. In
order to avoid having to consider the use of randomization to
determine the final decision for agent k (due to a mathematical
technicality in the proof of Theorem 2 below), and for the
ease of interpreting results, we will assume throughout this
paper that the right hand side of (7) has a unique solution
with probability one.
Assumption 3. For every agent k = 1, . . . ,K, and for any
policy xk, the minimization on the right hand side of (7) has
a unique solution with probability one.
Assumption 3 is satisfied if conditioned on any hypothesis
H ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}, (`γm0)m≥1 are continuous random
variables with a joint probability density function. To see
this, it can be shown via an easy inductive argument that
(`m0(Yk[1 : nk]))m≥1 are in turn continuous random variables
under any hypothesis H . Assumption 3 then follows by the
same argument in Lemma 5.1 of [13], which we refer the
reader to. This shows that Assumption 3 holds in most prac-
tical applications as private observations are usually modeled
as noisy, with the noise typically having a probability density
function like the Gaussian probability density [36], [37].
If agent 0 follows expert k, its loss exponent depends on
the loss exponent (2) of the expert k, which is in turn related
to the probability exponents
lim sup
nk→∞
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d), (8)
where m ∈ [0,M − 1] and d ∈ [0, dk − 1]. In the following,
our aim is to characterize the probability exponents (8). We
use (7) to characterize (8) by first letting
g˜k(z, d, nk) =
1
nk
log
M−1∑
m=0
pime
logCk(m,d,nk)+nkz[m],
and
gk(z, d, nk) = g˜k(z, d, nk)−min
d′ 6=d
g˜k(z, d
′, nk),
where z = (z[0], z[1], . . . , z[M − 1]) ∈ RM . Suppose that
agent k adopts the policy xk,nk when it has access to nk
private observations. Then from (7) and Assumption 3, we
obtain
Pm(Dk = d) = Pm(gk(Z¯0nk(xk,nk), d, nk) < 0), (9)
where
Z¯nk(xk,nk) =
(
1
nk
log `m0(Yk[1 : nk])
)M−1
m=1
(10)
is a vector in RM of log likelihood ratios, and Z¯0nk(xk,nk) =
(0, Z¯nk(xk,nk)) is the vector of log likelihood ratios aug-
mented with 0 as the first entry (this corresponds to 1/nk ·
log `00(Yk[1 : nk]) = 0). In the following, we show that
gk(z, d, nk) converges uniformly in z to
fk(z, d) = f˜k(z, d)−min
d′ 6=d
f˜k(z, d
′), (11)
where
f˜k(z, d) = max
0≤m≤M−1
{z[m]− ck(m, d)}. (12)
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For all k =
1, . . . ,K, and all d ∈ [0, dk − 1], g˜k(z, d, n) → f˜k(z, d) and
gk(z, d, n)→ fk(z, d) uniformly in z ∈ RM as n→∞.
Proof: See Appendix B.
We are now ready to present our first main result. Since we
are working in the regime of large nk, Lemma 1 tells us that
we can replace gk with fk in (9). For k ≥ 1, let
Ak(d) =
{
z ∈ RM−1 : fk(z0, d) < 0, where z0 = (0, z)
}
,
(13)
The set Ak(d) can be interpreted as the asymptotic deci-
sion region for expert k to declare decision d based on
its sufficient statistics Z¯nk(xk,nk); see Section III-B for a
discussion. Assumption 3 is required here to ensure that the
sets Ak(d), d ∈ [0, dk − 1] are disjoint.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
Consider an agent k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} who adopts a sequence
of optimal policies (xk,nk)nk≥1 that minimizes (1) for each
nk. Then, we have the following:
(i) The loss exponent of agent k is given by
lim
nk→∞
1
nk
logE [Ck(H,Dk, nk)] = − max
x∈S(Γk)
Ik(x),
where
Ik(x) = min
0≤m≤M−1
0≤d≤dk−1
{
inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗m(z, x) + ck(m, d)
}
. (14)
7(ii) There is no loss in optimality asymptotically, if
we restrict the sequence of policies (xk,nk)nk≥1
such that limnk→∞ xk,nk = x
∗
k, for some x
∗
k ∈
arg maxx∈S(Γk) Ik(x).
(iii) Let x∗k ∈ arg maxx∈S(Γk) Ik(x). For every m ∈ [0,M −
1], and d ∈ [0, dk − 1], we have
lim
nk→∞
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d) = − inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗m(z, x
∗
k).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 2 allows each expert to find an asymptotically
optimal policy by maximizing (14) (see Remark 2 in Section
IV-A). In addition, we will see later that Theorem 2(iii)
allows agent 0 to characterize its own loss exponent and thus
optimally choose the expert to follow.
Remark 1. The quantity Ik(x) in (14) can be interpreted as
the rate of loss decay for agent k adopting policy x, i.e., for
nk sufficiently large, we have
E [Ck(H,Dk, nk)] ≈ g(nk)e−Ik(x),
where g(nk) is a function that decays faster than exponentially
in nk. To achieve a smaller loss, agent k then chooses a policy
x that maximizes Ik(x). Observe that Ik(x) is the minimiza-
tion over all m ∈ [0,M − 1] and d ∈ [0, dk − 1] of the terms
infz∈Ak(d) Φ
∗
m(z, x) + ck(m, d), where infz∈Ak(d) Φ
∗
m(z, x)
is the absolute probability exponent in Theorem 2(iii), while
ck(m, d) is the loss function decay rate of declaring decision
d when the true hypothesis is m. Therefore, each term in the
minimization of the right hand side of (14) is the absolute
decay rate of Ck(m, d, nk)Pm(Dk = d), and the overall loss
exponent is dominated by the term that decays the slowest,
which is what we expect from large deviations theory (cf.
Lemma 1.2.15 of [35]). We next provide an intuitive interpre-
tation for the regions Ak(d) in the following subsection.
B. Asymptotic Decision Regions
Suppose that agent k ≥ 1 adopts the sequence of policies
xk,nk → xk as nk →∞. From (9), for large nk, we have for
each m ∈ [0,M − 1], and d ∈ [0, dk − 1],
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d) ≈ 1
nk
logPm(fk(Z¯nk(xk,nk), d) < 0)
≈ − inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗m(z, xk),
where Ak(d) is as defined in (13), and Φ∗m(z, xk) can be
interpreted as a rate function. In the same spirit as the
Ga¨rtner-Ellis Theorem [35], we can interpret the sets Ak(d)
as the asymptotic decision region for deciding Dk = d
based on Z¯nk(xk,nk) as nk → ∞, where the rate of decay
of Pm(Dk = d) is dominated by the rate at a particular
realization of Z¯nk(xk,nk) in the region Ak(d). We refer the
reader to Appendix C for a characterization of Ak(d) in terms
of the union of intersections of multiple half-spaces.
In the following, we list some properties of the rate func-
tions Φ∗m(·, ·) that will be useful in helping us to interpret our
results.
Lemma 3. For every m ∈ [0,M − 1], Φ∗m(z, x) is non-
negative, convex in z and concave in x. Furthermore, for any
policy x, min
z∈RM−1
Φ∗m(z, x) = 0, and the minimum is achieved
at
z˜m(x) =
∑
γ
x[γ]Em [Zγ ], (15)
where Zγ = (log `γi0)
M−1
i=1 .
Proof: See Appendix B.
In particular, if dk = M , and the loss function of agent k
adopting the policy xk is such that z˜m(xk) ∈ Ak(m) in (15)
for every m, then we can interpret the decision m of agent k as
in favor of hypothesis H = m since Pm(Dk = m) is bounded
away from 0 and has decay rate infz∈Ak(m) Φ
∗
m(z, xk) = 0.
C. Loss Exponent of Agent 0
In the following, we characterize the loss exponent of agent
0 if it chooses expert k. Recall that qk = limn0→∞ nk/n0.
Theorem 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
Suppose that agent 0 adopts the opinion of expert k ≥ 1,
which has the asymptotically optimal policy x∗k. Then, the loss
exponent of agent 0 is
lim
n0→∞
1
n0
logE [C0(H,D0(k), n0)] = − max
x0∈S(Γ0)
E0(k, x0),
where 5
E0(k, x0)
= min
i6=j
0≤d≤dk−1
max
s∈[0,1]
{
(1− s)
(
qk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗i (z, x
∗
k) + c0(i)
)
+ s
(
qk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗j (z, x
∗
k) + c0(j)
)
− Λij(s, x0)
}
.
(16)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Following Remark 1, we can again interpret each term
in the minimization on the right hand side of (16) as the
absolute error exponent incurred when differentiating between
hypotheses i and j. From Theorem 2 and Theorem 4, we see
that the choice of an expert k affects agent 0’s loss exponent
through the rate of decay of the probabilities Pi(Dk = d)
and Pj(Dk = d), which is to be expected. In particular, if
the loss function of the expert k is such that we can interpret
the decision d of the expert as in favor of hypothesis d, then
Pi(Dk = i) > 0 yields infz∈Ak(d) Φ∗i (z, x∗k) = 0, and it does
not contribute to the decay of the expected loss of agent 0.
IV. OPTIMAL CHOICE OF EXPERT
We now address the question of how to choose an optimal
expert for agent 0. We first revisit Theorem 4 to derive the
optimal loss exponent for agent 0, and then we make additional
simplifying assumptions in order to provide more insights
into our results. Finally, we discuss a numerical example to
illustrate the use of our optimal loss exponent characterizations
in finding the optimal policies and expert choice.
5To avoid cluttered notations, we let mini 6=j and maxi6=j be the mini-
mization or maximization over all unordered pairs (i, j) ∈ [0,M − 1]2 such
that i 6= j, respectively.
8A. Choosing an Expert
If agent 0 does not incorporate the opinion of any expert, we
use the notation E0(0, x0) to denote its absolute loss exponent
when using policy x0. From Theorem 4, by setting qk = 0,
we have
E0(0, x0) = min
i 6=j
max
s∈[0,1]
{(1− s)c0(i) + sc0(j)− Λij(s, x0)} .
(17)
In the case of minimizing the error probability at agent 0 with
0-1 loss function, and without the help of any experts, we
can further set c0(i) = c0(j) = 0 to obtain the absolute error
exponent
E0,B(0, x0) = −max
i 6=j
min
s∈[0,1]
Λij(s, x0), (18)
which recovers the result in [32]. Similarly, if agent 0 chooses
expert k, and adopts the 0-1 loss function, we let its absolute
loss exponent be
E0,B(k, x0) = min
i 6=j
0≤d≤dk−1
max
s∈[0,1]
{
(1− s)qk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗i (z, x
∗
k)
+ sqk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗j (z, x
∗
k)− Λij(s, x0)
}
.
(19)
The following proposition follows immediately from Theo-
rem 4, and provides a method for agent 0 to optimally choose
which expert to follow.
Theorem 5. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. The
optimal loss exponent of agent 0 is
min
1 ≤k≤K
lim
n0 →∞
1
n0
logE [C0(H,D0(k), n0)]
= − max
1≤k≤K
max
x0∈S(Γ0)
E0(k, x0).
Furthermore, for any k ≥ 1 and policy x0, we have
E0(k, x0) ≥ E0,B(k, x0) (20)
E0(k, x0) ≥ E0(0, x0) ≥ E0,B(0, x0). (21)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 2. Theorem 5 shows that agent 0 should choose an
expert k that maximizes maxx0 E0(k, x0), which depends on
infz∈Ak(d) Φ
∗
m(z, x
∗
k), for m ∈ [0,M − 1] and d ∈ [0, dk− 1].
We now discuss procedures that can achieve this, depending on
the amount of information that agent 0 has about the experts:
(i) If the experts’ probability exponents
{infz∈Ak(d) Φ∗m(z, x∗k) : m ∈ [0,M−1], d ∈ [0, dk−1]}
for all k ≥ 1 are publicized, then agent 0 simply needs
to find its optimal policy x0 that maximizes E0(k, x0)
in Theorem 5 for each k, and choose the expert that
produces the largest maxx0 E0(k, x0). To find the
optimal policy x0 corresponding to an expert k, we can
use an iterative procedure as follows:
Step 1. An initial guess for the optimal policy x∗0(0) is
made. Set l = 1.
Step 2. For each pair (i, j) ∈ [0,M − 1], i 6= j, and
d ∈ [0, dk−1], find sijd(l) that is the maximizer
of the optimization problem over s ∈ [0, 1] on
the right hand side of (16). Note that this is
equivalent to a convex minimization problem,
which can be solved via standard convex op-
timization methods [38].
Step 3. Find x∗0(l) = (x[γ])γ∈Γ0 by solving the linear
program:
max
r,(x[γ])γ∈Γ0
r
subject to
r ≤ (1− sijd(l))
(
qk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗i (z, x
∗
k) + c0(i)
)
+ sijd(l)
(
qk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗j (z, x
∗
k) + c0(j)
)
−
∑
γ∈Γ0
x[γ] logEi
[
(`γji)
sijd
]
,
∀i, j ∈ [0,M − 1], i 6= j,∀d ∈ [0, dk − 1],
x[γ] ≥ 0, ∀γ ∈ Γ0,∑
γ∈Γ0
x[γ] = 1.
Step 4. Set l = l+1 and repeat Steps 2-4 till x∗0(l) does
not change significantly.
(ii) If agent 0 knows only the experts’ loss functions and
optimal policies x∗k for all k ≥ 1, then it can com-
pute infz∈Ak(d) Φ
∗
m(z, x
∗
k) for all m ∈ [0,M − 1]
and d ∈ [0, dk − 1] by searching for the minimum
of Φ∗m(z, x
∗
k) on the boundaries of Ak(d), if z˜m(x
∗
k)
in (15) is not in Ak(d). This is because Φ∗m(z, x
∗
k)
is convex in z (cf. Lemma 3), and the search can be
performed using standard convex optimization methods
[38]. The boundaries of Ak(d) can be found through its
characterization in Appendix C (see Section IV-C for
an example). If z˜m(x∗k) ∈ Ak(d), then from Lemma 3,
we obtain infz∈Ak(d) Φ
∗
m(z, x
∗
k) = 0. Once the experts’
probability exponents have been computed, the same
procedure as in item (i) above can now be used to choose
the optimal expert.
(iii) If agent 0 knows only the experts’ loss functions, it
can utilize Theorem 2(i) to determine the policy that
each expert adopts. This however may not be an easy
numerical procedure if M and dk are large, even in the
case where the expert has 0-1 loss function [32]. We
propose the following alternating optimization approach
for finding the optimal policy of expert k:
Step 1. An initial guess for the optimal policy x∗k(0) is
made. Set l = 1.
Step 2. For each m ∈ [0,M − 1] and d ∈ [0, dk − 1],
find zm,d(l) = arg infz∈Ak(d) Φ
∗
m(z, x
∗
k(l − 1)).
As noted in item (ii) above, this can be obtained
via standard convex optimization methods. Let
tm,d(l)) = arg max
t ∈RM−1
{〈t, zm,d(l − 1)〉
− ϕm(t, x∗k(l))} .
9Step 3. Find x∗k(l) = (x[γ])γ∈Γk by solving the linear
program
max
r,(x[γ])γ∈Γk
r
subject to
r ≤ 〈tm,d(l), zm,d(l)〉
−
∑
γ∈Γk
x[γ]ξm(γ, tm,d(l)) + ck(m, d),
∀m ∈ [0,M − 1],∀d ∈ [0, dk − 1],
x[γ] ≥ 0, ∀γ ∈ Γk,∑
γ∈Γk
x[γ] = 1.
Step 4. Set l = l+1 and repeat Steps 2-4 till x∗k(l) does
not change significantly.
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the above pro-
cedure converges to the correct solution. However, in
our numerical experiments, we were able to arrive at the
correct optimal policy by using multiple initial guesses.
A numerical example is presented in Section IV-C.
Remark 3. The first inequality in (21) shows that there is
no loss in optimality for agent 0 to incorporate the opinion
of any expert, verifying the adage that there is no harm in
having more information. However, incorporating additional
information does not necessarily improve its loss exponent;
see Proposition 6.
The inequality in (20) shows that of all the loss functions
satisfying Assumption 1(i), the 0-1 loss is the worst canonical
loss function for agent 0. In particular, consider the set of loss
functions with C0(m, d, n0) = C0(m,n0) for all m ∈ [0,M−
1] and d 6= m, where the limit c0(m) = − limn0→∞(1/n0)
logC0(m,n0) exists. Furthermore, each loss function has a
total cost constraint,
M−1∑
m=0
C0(m,n0) = M − 1.
It can be shown that all such loss functions satisfy Assumption
1(i), and are canonical loss functions. The 0-1 loss function
belongs to this set, and divides the total cost equally among
all types of missed detections, which results in the worst loss
exponent for agent 0. This can be explained intuitively by
observing that if there exists a m such that c0(m) > 0, then
missed detection of H = m incurs an exponentially decaying
loss, so that the hypothesis m can effectively be ignored. Agent
0 then effectively has a smaller set of hypotheses, leading to
a lower expected loss.
Remark 4. It is easy to generalize Theorem 4 or Theorem
5 to the case where more than one agent can be chosen. In
particular, if all K experts’ opinions are adopted by agent 0,
Theorem 4 holds with E0(k, x0) replaced by
min
i6=j
(pk)
K
k=1
max
s∈[0,1]
{
(1− s)
(
K∑
k=1
qk inf
z∈Ak(pk)
Φ∗i (z, x
∗
k) + c0(i)
)
+ s
(
K∑
k=1
qk inf
z∈Ak(pk)
Φ∗j (z, x
∗
k) + c0(j)
)
− Λij(s, x0)
}
where the sequences (pk)Kk=1 ∈
∏K
k=1[0, dk − 1].
In the following subsection, we consider the special cases
where the size of each expert’s decision space is less than or
equal to M under additional simplifying assumptions.
B. Special Cases
In this section, we assume that agent 0’s policy has been
fixed in advance. We first consider the case where an expert
k may have a decision space smaller than the number of
hypotheses M that agent 0 has. To state our results, suppose
that agent 0 adopts policy x0 and has loss decay rates given
by the function c0. We define the loss augmented log moment
generating function for i, j ∈ [0,M − 1] as
Λij(s, x0, c0) = Λij(s, x0)− (1− s)c0(i)− sc0(j). (22)
For the case where agent 0 adopts the 0-1 loss function, we
have c0(i) = 0 for all i. We observe that in this case, the
Chernoff information −mins∈[0,1] Λij(s, x0) tells us how well
hypothesis i can be differentiated from hypothesis j, where
a larger Chernoff information corresponds to a faster error
probability decay [35]. This leads us to the following general
definition: For a given policy x0, if there exists a constant α
so that mins∈[0,1] Λij(s, x0, c0) = α for all i 6= j, we say that
the policy x0 is hypothesis-loss neutral for agent 0.
Intuitively, a policy is hypothesis-loss neutral if it can
differentiate any pair of hypotheses equally well when adjusted
for the agent’s “biases”. It may be argued that in practical
scenarios, an agent would strive to be hypothesis-loss neutral,
since otherwise there are hypotheses that are relatively less
important than others, and can be dropped. In the following,
we show that if agent 0 is hypothesis-loss neutral, an expert’s
opinion is useless if it does not have a decision space as large
as M .
Proposition 6. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
Suppose that agent 0 adopts a policy x0 that is hypothesis-
loss neutral. Then, for any agent k ≥ 1, if dk < M , we have
E0(k, x0) = E0,B(0, x0), i.e., agent 0 ignores the opinion of
agent k.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 6 can be explained intuitively as follows in the
case where agent 0 has 0-1 loss function. If an expert k has
dk < M , then there exists two hypotheses i and j of agent
0 that it does not discriminate between. The probability of
making an error between these two hypotheses by the expert is
therefore one, and the expert’s opinion does not help agent 0 to
differentiate between hypotheses i and j. The error probability
of agent 0 declaring H = i when the true hypothesis is H = j
or vice versa, thus dominates when agent 0 is hypothesis-loss
neutral, and is the same as when agent 0 ignores the expert’s
opinion.
We next consider the case where experts have the same
decision space as agent 0, and has zero loss if they decide on
the true underlying hypothesis. We also make the following
simplifying assumption.
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Assumption 4. Every agent k ≥ 1 has dk = M , with loss
decay rates
ck(m, d) =
{
ck(m) if d 6= m,
∞ if d = m,,
where ck(m) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ [0,M − 1].
Proposition 7. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. Suppose
that agent 0 adopts policy x0, and follows the opinion of expert
k ≥ 1, who adopts the policy xk. Then, the loss exponent of
agent 0 is
lim
n0→∞
1
n0
logE [C0(H,D0(k), n0)] = −E˜0(k, x0), (23)
where 6
E˜0(k, x0) = min
i,j:i6=j
max
s∈[0,1]
{
sqkΛ
∗
ji(ck(i)− ck(j), xk)
− Λij(s, x0, c0)
}
.
In addition, if for some i 6= j such that c0(i) = c0(j), and
Λij(s, x0) = Λji(s, x0), ∀s ∈ [0, 1], (24)
then there is no loss in optimality for agent 0 to restrict to ex-
perts k with canonical loss functions satisfying ck(i) = ck(j).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Surprisingly, Proposition 7 shows that it is not necessarily
optimal for agent 0 to choose an expert who utilizes the same
canonical loss function as itself since agent 0’s loss exponent
depends only on the relative differences in agent k’s loss
function at each hypothesis. We show a numerical example
of this phenomenon in Section IV-C below. In particular, if
agent 0 adopts the 0-1 loss function, and (24) does not hold
for some i 6= j, then an example can be constructed in which
an expert with a loss function different from the 0-1 loss is
optimal for agent 0.
On the other hand, if agent 0 is “unbiased” (in terms of loss)
towards a pair of hypotheses (i, j) and (24) holds, Proposition
7 tells us that it is optimal for agent 0 to choose an expert,
if any, who is also “unbiased” towards hypotheses (i, j). This
indicates that if agent 0 has the same discriminatory power for
a particular pair of hypotheses (which is the intuitive meaning
of (24)), then it values information from an “unbiased” expert
more than one who has the same “bias” as itself. Assuming
that independent news agencies are in general “unbiased,”
our result suggests that such news agencies are unlikely to
be replaced by social news reporting or social blogs. The
following corollary follows immediately from Proposition 7.
Corollary 8. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. Suppose that
agent 0 adopts policy x0, and has 0-1 loss function. If for every
distinct pair of hypotheses (i, j), (24) holds, then it is optimal
for agent 0 to choose an expert, if any, who also has the 0-1
loss function.
6The notation mini,j:i6=j means minimization over all ordered pairs (i, j)
with i, j ∈ [0,M − 1] and i 6= j.
C. Numerical Example
In this section, we present a numerical example to illustrate
our results. Suppose that M = 3, there are 3 experts to choose
from, and all agents have access to private observations from
two information sources Γ = {γ1, γ2}, whose conditional dis-
tributions are shown in Table I. We use the notationN (µ, σ2)
to denote the normal distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2.7 For example, the three hypotheses can correspond to the
financial health of a company being “bad”, “neutral”, and
“good” respectively. The information source γ1 represents a
view that tends to be optimistic when the true health of the
company is “neutral”, while γ2 represents a view that tends to
be pessimistic.
TABLE I: Conditional distributions of the information sources.
Hypothesis H γ1 γ2
0 N (−1, σ2) N (−1, σ2)
1 N (δ, σ2) N (−δ, σ2)
2 N (1, σ2) N (1, σ2)
In this example, we take σ = 2, qk = 1 for all k ≥ 1, and
assume Assumption 4 for easier interpretation of our results.
The asymptotic decision regions of each agent k ≥ 1 can be
shown, using the characterization in Appendix C, to be that in
Figure 2. For each agent k, let ck = (ck(0), ck(1), ck(2)) be its
vector of loss decay rates. Let c1 = (0, 0, 0), c2 = (0, 0, 0.2),
and c3 = (0, 0.05, 0). We use the alternating optimization
procedure in Remark 2 item (iii) to find the optimal policies
for each agent. An exhaustive search is done to determine the
actual optimal policy for each expert, which is given in Table
II. Note that the experts’ optimal policies are invariant of δ.
(
ck(1)− ck(0), ck(2)− ck(0)
)
Ak(0) Ak(1)
Ak(2)
0
FIG. 2: Asymptotic decision regions for agent k. The dotted lines denote the
boundaries between the regions.
For experts 1 and 3, their optimal policies are both given
by x1[γ1] = x1[γ2] = 0.5, as is expected from the symmetry
of the problem. For expert 2, its optimal policy is given by
x2[γ1] = 1 and x2[γ2] = 0. This is because with a positive loss
decay rate c2(2) = 0.2, expert 2 puts exponentially less loss on
confusing hypothesis 2 for the others, therefore it chooses γ1
as its sole information source. For the alternating optimization
7Normal distributions have been used to model social opinions and influ-
ences in the economics literature, including [36], [37].
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TABLE II: Optimal policies for agents. The leftmost columns show the
optimal policies for each expert. The three rightmost columns show the
optimal policy and loss decay rate of an agent 0 with c0 = c3, corresponding
to each expert choice.
Expert k x∗k[γ1] x
∗
k[γ2] x
∗
0[γ1] x
∗
0[γ2] E0(k, x0)
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1099
2 1 0 0.2117 0.7883 0.1158
3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1066
procedure, we started our initial guesses at (x[γ1], x[γ2]) =
(0, 1) and (0.3, 0.7).8 We repeated the procedure for different
values of δ. In all cases, we were able to find the correct
optimal policies within 22 iterations (totaled over the two runs
corresponding to the two initial guesses), as shown in Figure
3. In some cases however, the procedure does not converge
to the correct optimal policy if we restrict ourselves to the
single initial guess (x[γ1], x[γ2]) = (0, 1). This shows that the
proposed procedure can get stuck at a suboptimal policy.
FIG. 3: Total number of iterations required to find optimal policies for experts
1, 2, and 3.
We next suppose that c0 = c3, and use the procedure in
Remark 2 item (i) to obtain the optimal policy for agent 0
w.r.t. each expert k = 1, 2, 3, when δ = 0.9. We found the
optimal policies for agent 0 within 4 iterations in each case,
and that choosing expert 2 produces the best loss exponent for
agent 0, as shown in Table II. In this case, it is not optimal for
agent 0 to choose expert 3, which has the same loss function
as itself. Observe that even if agent 0’s policy is fixed at
x0 = (0.5, 0.5), it will still prefer expert 1 over expert 3.
On the other hand, if c0 = c1, we have E0(1, x0) = 0.0884 >
E0(3, x0) = 0.0750 > E0(2, x0) = 0.0566, i.e., agent 0’s
optimal expert choice is expert 1. It can be shown that (24)
holds for all pairs of hypotheses in this example, thus verifying
Corollary 8.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied a multihypothesis social learning problem
in which an agent makes a decision with the help of a
chosen expert. We have considered a general framework that
allows the agent and experts to have different loss functions
(biases), and different decision spaces. We have characterized
the loss exponent of the agent in terms of the chosen expert’s
probability error exponent, which allows us to choose the
asymptotically optimal expert as well as the agent’s policy.
8Although a more natural initial guess is (0.5, 0.5), this was not selected
in order to test the convergence for experts 1 and 3.
We have shown that if the experts have the same decision
space as the agent, then it is not necessarily optimal for the
agent to choose an expert with the same loss function as
itself. Moreover, if the agent is hypothesis-loss neutral, then
it ignores any expert with a decision space smaller than the
number of hypotheses.
The results in this paper are limited by our setup and
assumptions, which however allows us to obtain analytical
characterizations of the asymptotically optimal policies for
the agent and experts, and an asymptotically optimal expert
choice. In the regime of a finite number of private observa-
tions, these policies are in general sub-optimal. Finding the
exact optimal policies in this regime is however analytically
difficult, and the asymptotically optimal policies can be uti-
lized when the numbers of private observations are large.
In this paper, we have assumed that the agent knows the
experts’ loss decay rates, which may not be valid in some prac-
tical scenarios. For example, expert opinions may very well
depend on the mood of the expert at the time the opinion is
publicized. Therefore, it is of interest to consider minimax loss
exponents in which the expert’s loss function or observation
probability distributions are drawn from uncertainty classes.
Minimax decentralized hypothesis testing has been studied
in [39], and in our recent work [34] in which we consider
robust social learning in a tandem network. However, addi-
tional research in minimax decentralized hypothesis testing is
required to address more complex network architectures and
applications like that considered in this paper.
APPENDIX A
MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this appendix, we briefly review some basic definitions
and a result from large deviations theory. The reader is referred
to [35], [40] for details. The notation Tr (A) denotes the trace
of the matrix A, ∇tf(t) is the gradient of f(t) w.r.t. the vector
t, and ∇2tf(t) is the Hessian w.r.t. t of the function f(t).
Let X be a Polish space. The function Φ : X 7→ [0,∞] is
said to be a good rate function if Φ is lower semicontinuous
and has compact level sets {x ∈ X : Φ(x) ≤ c} for all
c ≥ 0. Let (Pn)n≥1 be a sequence of probability measures on
X . This sequence of probability measures is said to satisfy a
large deviation principle (LDP) if for some good rate function
Φ, and for all closed sets C ⊂ X , we have
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logPn(C) ≤ − inf
x∈C
Φ(x),
and for all open sets O ⊂ X , we have
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logPn(O) ≥ − inf
x∈O
Φ(x).
A sequence of random variables (Zn)n≥1 is said to satisfy
a LDP if the sequence of marginal distributions Pn(·) =
P(Zn ∈ ·) satisfies a LDP. The celebrated Ga¨rtner-Ellis
Theorem [35] provides sufficient conditions for a sequence
of random variables to satisfy a LDP. In the following, we
present a partial version of the Ga¨rtner-Ellis Theorem
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Theorem A.1. Let (Zn)n≥1 be a sequence of RM -valued
random variables, so that
ϕ(t) = lim
n→∞
1
n
logE [exp(〈t, Zn〉)]
exists. Let
Φ∗(z) = sup
t
{〈t, z〉 − ϕ(t)}
be the Fenchel-Legendre transform of ϕ. Then, under the
assumptions in Theorem 2.3.6 of [35], the LDP holds with
good rate function Φ∗.
When not all the conditions required by the Ga¨rtner-Ellis
Theorem hold (as is the case in some of our proofs), we instead
make use of a uniform lower bound given by the following
lemma, which is a generalization of Theorem 1.3.13 of [40].
The proof is omitted here for brevity.
Lemma A.1. Let Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn be independent RM -valued
random variables, with x[γ] fraction of them having distribu-
tion Pγ , for each γ ∈ Γ. Let Zγ have distribution Pγ ,
ϕ(t) =
∑
γ∈Γ
x[γ] logE [exp(〈t, Zγ〉)],
and
Φ∗(z) = sup
t
{〈t, z〉 − ϕ(t)} .
Suppose that E [exp(〈t, Zγ〉)] < ∞ for all t ∈ RM , then for
tz such that ∇tϕ(tz) = z, and any  > 0, we have
(25)
1
n
logP
(
1
n
n∑
l=1
Zl ∈ B(z)
)
≥ −Φ∗(z)− ‖tz‖+ 1
n
log
(
1 − 1
n2
Tr
(∇2tϕ(tz))) .
In this paper, we apply Lemma A.1 in cases where ϕ
corresponds to ϕm in (4). We will often need to further lower
bound (25) by finding an upper bound for ∇2tϕm(tz) that does
not depend on n or the particular policy adopted by an agent.
Assumption 2 implies an upper bound for ∇2tϕm, as shown
in the following elementary lemma.
Lemma A.2. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then there
exists a non-decreasing function G(r), finite for each r ≥ 0,
such that for all t ∈ Br(0), and all γ ∈
⋃
k Γk, we have for
all m ≥ 0,
0 ≤ Tr (∇2t ξm(γ, t)) ≤ G(r). (26)
Proof: The lower inequality in (26) holds because
ξm(γ, t) is convex in t for each γ (see Lemma 2.2.31 of [35]).
Furthermore, we can define
G(r) = max
t∈Br(0)
γ∈Γ
Tr
(∇2t ξm(γ, t)),
which is finite because of Assumption 2, and the fact that
Tr
(∇2t ξm(γ, t)) is continuous on the compact set Br(0). The
proof of the lemma is now complete.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF MAIN RESULTS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Let  be a positive number. From Assumption 1(ii),
for n sufficiently large, we have (logM)/n ≤ /2,
minm(log pim)/n ≥ −/2, and∣∣∣∣ 1n logCk(m, d, n) + ck(m, d)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 ,
for all m ∈ [0,M − 1]. This implies that for all z ∈ RM , we
have
g˜k(z, d, n) ≤ max
m
{ 1
n
logCk(m, d, n) + z[m]}+ 1
n
logM
≤ max
m
{−ck(m, d) + z[m]}+ 
= f˜k(z, d) + ,
and
g˜k(z, d, n) ≥ max
m
{
1
n
logCk(m, d, n) + z[m]
}
+ min
m
log pim
n
≥ max
m
{−ck(m, d) + z[m]} − 
= f˜k(z, d)− ,
which shows that g˜k(z, d, n)→ f˜k(z, d) uniformly in z. Since
the minimum of a finite set of uniformly convergent functions
is also uniformly convergent, the lemma follows.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We prove claim (i) of Theorem 2 by first deriving a lower
bound for the loss exponent of agent k, and showing that this
bound is achievable. We have for any  > 0, and nk sufficiently
large,
1
nk
logE [Ck(H,Dk, nk)]
=
1
nk
log
M−1∑
m=0
dk−1∑
d=0
pimCk(m, d, nk)Pm(Dk = d)
≥ max
0≤m≤M−1
0≤d≤dk−1
{
1
nk
logCk(m, d, nk) +
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d)
}
+ min
m
1
nk
log pim
≥ max
0≤m≤M−1
0≤d≤dk−1
{
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d)− ck(m, d)
}
− , (27)
which can be further lower bounded by lower bounds on the
probability exponents. For each z ∈ RM−1, let tz be the
solution to the equation
∇tϕi(t, xk,nk) = z,
if the solution exists. For each r > 0, let Hr = {z ∈
RM−1 : tz exists, ‖tz‖ ≤ r}, and Ak(d, r, ) = {z ∈ RM−1 :
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0, d) < −/2, where z0 = (0, z)} ∩ Hr. From (9) and
(10), we then have for any u < −,
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d)
=
1
nk
logPm(gk(Z¯0nk(xk,nk), d, nk) < 0) (28)
≥ 1
nk
logPm(gk(Z¯0nk(xk,nk), d, nk) ∈ [u− , u+ ])
≥ 1
nk
logPm(fk(Z¯0nk(xk,nk), d) ∈ [u−

2
, u+

2
])
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1 for nk
sufficiently large.9 Since u < − is arbitrary, we obtain for
nk sufficiently large,
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d)
≥ sup
z:B(z)⊂Ak(d,r,)
1
nk
logPm(Z¯nk(xk,nk) ∈ B(z)), (29)
where B(z) is an open sphere of radius  around z. From
Lemma A.1, we can further lower bound the right hand side
of (29) to obtain
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d)
≥ − inf
z:B(z)⊂Ak(d,r,)
{
Φ∗m(z, xk,nk) + ‖tz‖
− 1
nk
log
(
1− 1
nk2
Tr
(∇2tϕi(tz, xk,nk)))}
≥ − inf
z:B(z)⊂Ak(d,r,)
Φ∗m(z, xk,nk) + r
− 1
nk
log
(
1− 1
nk2
G(r)
)
, (30)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma A.2. Combining
(30) with (27), and letting nk →∞, and then taking r = 1/
√

and → 0, we have
lim inf
nk→∞
1
nk
logE [Ck(H,Dk, nk)] ≥ − sup
x∈S(Γk)
Ik(x). (31)
Since Φ∗m(z, x) is continuous in x, infz∈Ak(d) Φ
∗
m(z, x)
is upper semi-continuous in x, and Ik(x) is upper semi-
continuous in x. In addition, S(Γk) is compact, therefore the
supremum over x on the right hand side of (31) is a max-
imization. Consider the policy x∗k = arg maxx∈S(Γk) Ik(x).
For each nk ≥ 1, let agent k use the policy xk,nk where
xk,nk [γ] = bx∗k[γ]nkc/nk for all γ ∈ Γk, and if xk,nk [γ]
do not sum to 1 over γ ∈ Γk, we simply choose the
remaining private observations from an arbitrary distribution,
and ignore them when making the decision for agent k. We
have xk,nk → x∗k as nk →∞. We first show a simple lemma.
Lemma B.1. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, agent k adopts
the policy xk,nk = (xk,nk [γ])γ∈Γk when it has access to nk
9Note that Assumption 3 is required in (28), without which
we need to replace Pm(gk(Z¯0nk (xk,nk ), d, nk) < 0) with
max{Pm(gk(Z¯0nk (xk,nk ), d, nk) < 0),Pm(gk(Z¯0nk (xk,nk ), d, nk) =
0)} if expert k uses randomization to produce its final decision. The second
term in the maximization unfortunately cannot be characterized using our
existing approach.
private observations, and xk,nk → xk as nk → ∞. Then,
the sequence of random variables (Z¯nk(xk,nk))nk≥1 defined
in (10) satisfies a LDP under hypothesis H = m, for every
m ∈ [0,M − 1], with good rate function Φ∗m(·, xk).
Proof: We apply the Ga¨rtner-Ellis Theorem [35] to
prove the lemma. Let Zi = (log `m0(Yk[i]))M−1m=1 . We have
nkZ¯nk(xk,nk) =
∑nk
i=1 Zi since Zi, i = 1 . . . , nk are inde-
pendent. For every t ∈ RM−1, we obtain
1
nk
logEm
[
exp
(〈
nkt, Z¯nk(xk,nk)
〉)]
=
1
nk
logEm
[
exp
(〈
t,
nk∑
i=1
Zi
〉)]
=
1
nk
nk∑
i=1
logEm [exp (〈t, Zi〉)]
=
∑
γ∈Γk
xk,nk [γ] logEm
[
exp
(〈
t, (log `γm0)
M−1
m=1
〉)]
→ ϕm(t, xk),
as nk → ∞. From Assumption 2 and Lemma 2.3.9 of [35],
we have Φ∗m(z, xk) is a good rate function, and the lemma
follows from the Ga¨rtner-Ellis Theorem.
From Lemma 1, we have for each d ∈ [0, dk − 1],
lim sup
nk→∞
sup
z
|gk(z, d, nk)− fk(z, d)|= 0,
and applying Theorem 4.2.23 of [35], we obtain from (28) and
Lemma B.1 that
lim sup
nk→∞
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d) ≤ − inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗m(z, x
∗
k). (32)
We then have
lim sup
nk→∞
1
nk
logE [Ck(H,Dk,ml)]
≤ lim sup
nk→∞
max
0≤m≤M−1
0≤d≤dk−1
{
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d)− ck(m, d)
}
≤ −Ik(x∗k), (33)
where the last inequality follows from (32). Finally, (31)
together with (33) gives us claim (i).
To show claim (ii), fix any x∗k ∈ arg maxx∈S(Γk) Ik(x). We
note that if there exists a subsequence of policies (xk,ml)l≥1
with liml→∞ xk,ml = xk and Ik(xk) < Ik(x
∗
k), then using
the same arguments that lead to (31), we have
lim inf
nk→∞
1
nk
logE [Ck(H,Dk, nk)] ≥ −Ik(xk) > −Ik(x∗k),
a contradiction to (33). Therefore, each policy subsequence
converges to some xk with Ik(xk) = Ik(x∗k), and there is no
loss in optimality if we restrict the sequence of policies to
converge to x∗k.
Finally, to show claim (iii), we have from (30) that
lim inf
l→∞
1
nk
logPm(Dk = d) ≥ − inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗m(z, x
∗
k), (34)
since Φ∗m(z, x) is continuous in x. Together with (32), the
claim now follows, and the theorem is proved.
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C. Proof of Lemma 3
The non-negativity and convexity of Φm(z, x) follows from
Lemma 2.2.31 of [35]. From Jensen’s inequality, for any t ∈
RM−1, we have
ϕm(t, x) ≥
∑
γ
x[γ]Em [〈t, Zγ〉] = 〈t, z˜m(x)〉,
which implies that Φm(z˜, x) = 0, and the lemma is proved.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
We first present a generalization of Theorem 5 of [41] (see
also [23] for a slightly more updated version). The proof steps
are similar to that in [41] and [23], and are provided below
for completeness.
Proposition B.1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and
agent 0 adopts the opinion of agent k ≥ 1 and policy x0. Let
s∗ij= argmax
s∈[0,1]
{
s
n0
log
C0(i, j, n0)Pi(Dk = d)
C0(j, i, n0)Pj(Dk = d)
− Λij(s, x0)
}
where Λij(·, ·) is as defined in (6). Then, for any  > 0, and
any d ∈ [0, dk − 1], there exists n such that for all n0 ≥ n,
we have for all i 6= j,
1
n0
log
{
minj′:j′ 6=i C0(i, j′, n0)Pi(D0(k) 6= i,Dk = d)
+C0(j, i, n0)Pj(D0(k) = i,Dk = d)
}
≥ (1− s∗ij)
(
1
n0
logPi(Dk = d)− c0(i)
)
+ s∗ij
(
1
n0
logPj(Dk = d)− c0(j)
)
+ Λij(s
∗
ij , x0)− .
(35)
Proof: From Theorem 5 of [41] (or Proposition A.2 of
[23]), we have for i, j ∈ [0,M − 1], with j 6= i, and every
s ∈ [0, 1], either
(36)
Pi(D0(k) 6= i | Dk = d)
≥ 1
4
exp
(
n0Λij(s, x0) − sn0 d
ds
Λij(s, x0)
− s
√
2n0
d2
ds2
Λij(s, x0)
)
,
or
(37)
Pj(D0(k) = i | Dk = d)
≥ 1
4
exp
(
n0Λij(s, x0) + (1 − s)n0 d
ds
Λij(s, x0)
− (1− s)
√
2n0
d2
ds2
Λij(s, x0)
)
.
If s∗ij ∈ (0, 1), we have
d
ds
Λij(s
∗
ij , x0) =
1
n0
log
C0(i, j, n0)Pi(Dk = d)
C0(j, i, n0)Pj(Dk = d)
,
and using Lemma A.2, (36) and (37), we obtain
1
n0
log
{
minj′:j′ 6=i C0(i, j′, n0)Pi(D0(k) 6= i,Dk = d)
+C0(j, i, n0)Pj(D0(k) = i,Dk = d)
}
≥ 1− s
∗
ij
n0
log( min
j′:j′ 6=i
C0(i, j
′, n0)Pi(Dk = d))
+
s∗ij
n0
log(C0(j, i, n0)Pj(Dk = d))
+ Λij(s
∗
ij , x0)−
1
n0
log 2−
√
2G(2)
n0
≥ (1− s∗ij)
(
1
n0
logPi(Dk = d)− c0(i)
)
+ s∗ij
(
1
n0
logPj(Dk = d)− c0(j)
)
+ Λij(s
∗
ij , x0)− ,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1 for n0
sufficiently large. On the other hand, if s∗ij = 0, we have
d
ds
Λij(0, x0) ≥ 1
n0
log
C0(i, j, n0)Pi(Dk = d)
C0(j, i, n0)Pj(Dk = d)
,
since Λij(s, x0) is convex s. The inequality (35) then holds
trivially. A similar argument holds for s∗ij = 1, and the
proposition is proved.
We next proceed to prove Theorem 4. Suppose that agent
0 adopts the policy x0. For any  > 0, and for n0 sufficiently
large, we have
1
n0
logE [C0(H,D0(k), n0)]
=
1
n0
log
dk−1∑
d=0
∑
i 6=j
piiC0(i, j, n0)Pi(D0(k) = j,Dk = d)
≥ max
i 6=j
0≤d≤dk−1
1
n0
log
 minj
′:j′ 6=i C0(i, j′, n0)
·Pi(D0(k) 6= i,Dk = d)
+C0(j, i, n0)Pj(D0(k) = i,Dk = d)

− 1
n0
log 2 + min
m
1
n0
log pim
≥ max
i 6=j
0≤d≤dk−1
min
s∈[0,1]
{
(1− s)
(
1
n0
logPi(Dk = d)− c0(i)
)
+ s
(
1
n0
logPj(Dk = d)− c0(j)
)
+ Λij(s, x0)
}
− , (38)
where the last inequality follows from Proposition B.1. By
letting n0 →∞ and → 0 in (38), we obtain
lim sup
n0→∞
1
n0
logE [C0(H,D0(k), n0)]
≥ max
i 6=j
0≤d≤dk−1
min
s∈[0,1]
{
(1− s)
(
lim
n0→∞
1
n0
logPi(Dk = d)− c0(i)
)
+ s
(
lim
n0→∞
1
n0
logPj(Dk = d)− c0(j)
)
+ Λij(s, x0)
}
,
(39)
and the lower bound (16) follows from Theorem 2(iii).
We next show that there exists a decision rule for agent 0
that achieves E0(x0) in (16). Given Dk = d, consider the
following rule to differentiate between hypotheses H = i
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and H = j for i 6= j: declare H = i iff 1n0 log `ji(Y0[1 :
n0]) ≤ hji, where hji = −qk infz∈Ak(d) Φ∗i (z, x∗k) +
qk infz∈Ak(d) Φ
∗
j (z, x
∗
k)− c0(i) + c0(j).
By a simple generalization of Crame´r’s Theorem10 [35], and
Theorem 2(iii), we have for every  > 0 and all n0 sufficiently
large,
1
n0
log(C0(i, j, n0)Pi(D0(k) = j,Dk = d))
=
1
n0
logC0(i, j, n0) +
1
n0
logPi(Dk = d)
+
1
n0
logPi(D0(k) = j | Dk = d)
≤ −c0(i)− qk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗i (z, x
∗
k)
− max
s∈[0,1]
{shji − Λij(s, x0)}+ 
≤ − max
s∈[0,1]
{
(1− s)
(
qk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗i (z, x
∗
k) + c0(i)
)
+ s
(
qk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗j (z, x
∗
k) + c0(j)
)
− Λij(s, x0)
}
+ ,
from which we obtain
1
n0
logE [C0(H,D0(k), n0)]
≤ max
i6=j
0≤d≤dk−1
1
n0
log (C0(i, j, n0)Pi(D0(k) = j,Dk = d))
+
1
n0
logM
≤ −E0(k, x0) + .
By taking n0 → ∞ and  → 0, we obtain the theorem by
maximizing E0(x0) over all policies x0. The proof is now
complete.
E. Proof of Theorem 5
The first part of the theorem is a direct consequence of
Theorem 4. From Lemma 3, we have infz∈Ak(d) Φ
∗
i (z, x
∗
k) ≥
0 for any i ∈ [0,M − 1], k ≥ 1, d ∈ [0, dk − 1], and policy
x∗k. Furthermore, Assumption 1 implies that c0(i) ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ [0,M−1]. Therefore, the inequalities (20) and (21) follow
from (16), (17), (18), and (19), and the proof is complete.
F. Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose that agent k adopts the policy xk. From the
pigeonhole principle, if dk < M , there exists a region Ak(d)
in which both Φi(·, xk) and Φj(·, xk) achieve their minimum
value of 0, for some i 6= j. Since for any (i′, j′), we have
max
s ∈[0,1]
{
(1− s)
(
qk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗i′(z, x
∗
k) + c0(i
′)
)
+ s
(
qk inf
z∈Ak(d)
Φ∗j′(z, x
∗
k) + c0(j
′)
)
− Λi′j′(s, x0)
}
≥ max
s∈[0,1]
(−Λi′j′(s, x0, c0))
= − min
s∈[0,1]
Λij(s, x0, c0),
10Crame´r’s Theorem applies to independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) observations. The private observations Y0[1 : n0] are not i.i.d., but
are independent and can be divided into groups of i.i.d. observations.
we obtain from (16) and (17),
E0(k, x0) = − min
s∈[0,1]
Λij(s, x0, c0) = E0,B(k, x0),
and the proposition is proved.
G. Proof of Proposition 7
Since the proof is similar to that of Theorem 4, we provide
only an outline here. From the proposition assumptions, we
have for every j ∈ [0,M − 1], Pj(Dk = j) is bounded
away from zero, i.e., limnk→∞(1/nk) logPj(Dk = j) = 0
because otherwise the expected loss of agent k can be de-
creased. Therefore, we have infz∈Ak(j) Φ
∗
j (z, xk) = 0. By
comparing (17) (with x0 replaced by xk) and (14), and
using an inductive argument, we have infz∈Ak(i) Φ
∗
j (z, xk) =
Λ∗ji(ck(i)− ck(j), xk), and (23) follows.
We next show the second part of the proposition. Suppose
that for some i 6= j, we have c0(i) = c0(j) and (24) holds.
Then from (22), we have Λij(s, x0, c0) = Λji(s, x0, c0) for
all s ∈ [0, 1]. Let gij(∆) = maxs∈[0,1]{sqkΛ∗ji(∆, xk) −
Λij(s, x0, c0)}. Note that gij(∆) is non-decreasing in ∆.
Therefore, since Λij(s, x0, c0) is symmetrical on s ∈ [0, 1],
we have min(gij(∆), gji(−∆)) is maximized if Λ∗ji(∆, xk) =
Λ∗ij(−∆, xk), which holds if ∆ = 0. Take ∆ = ck(i)− ck(j),
and the proposition follows.
APPENDIX C
CHARACTERIZATION OF ASYMPTOTIC DECISION REGIONS
In this appendix, we give a characterization for the asymp-
totic decision region Ak(d) for an agent k, and d ∈ [0, dk−1].
For i, j ∈ [0,M − 1] and p, q ∈ [0, dk], define the halfspace
Bk(i, p, j, q) = {z = (z[m])1≤m≤M−1 ∈ RM−1 :
z[i]− z[j] ≥ ck(i, p)− ck(j, q)}, (40)
where z[0] = 0. For each p ∈ [0, dk − 1], let mp ∈ [0,M − 1]
be a chosen corresponding index. From (12), we have z ∈
∩i 6=mBk(mp, p, i, p) iff f˜k(z, p) = z[mp]− ck(mp, p).
Consider a z ∈ RM−1 such that f(z, d) < 0. Then, there
exists a sequence (mp)0≤p≤dk−1 ∈ [0,M − 1]dk such that
f˜k(z, p) = z[mp] − ck(mp, p) for all p ∈ [0, dk − 1] and
f˜k(z, p)−f˜k(z, d) = z[mp]−z[md]−ck(mp, p)+ck(md, d) >
0 for all p 6= d, i.e.,
z ∈Hd((mp)dk−1p=0 )
,
dk−1⋂
p=0
⋂
i6=mp
Bk(mp, p, i, p)
⋂
p 6=d
Bk(mp, p,md, d),
where Hd((mp)dk−1p=0 ) is a polyhedron since it consists of
intersections of halfspaces. On the other hand, if such a
sequence (mp)dk−1p=0 exists, then z ∈ Ak(d). Therefore, the set
Ak(d) is the union over all sequences (mp)dk−1p=0 ∈ [0,M−1]dk
of the polyhedra Hd((mp)dk−1p=0 ).
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